Rough Concept Analysis by Kent, Robert E.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
06
98
6v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 12
 O
ct 
20
18
Rough Concept Analysis
Robert E. Kent
University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Little Rock, Arkansas, U.S.A.
Abstract
The theory introduced, presented and developed in this paper, is con-
cerned with Rough Concept Analysis. This theory is a synthesis of the
theory of Rough Sets pioneered by Zdzislaw Pawlak [4] with the theory
of Formal Concept Analysis pioneered by Rudolf Wille [5]. The central
notion in this paper of a rough formal concept combines in a natural
fashion the notion of a rough set with the notion of a formal concept:
“rough set + formal concept = rough formal concept”. A related paper
[2] provides a synthesis of the two important data modeling techniques:
conceptual scaling of Formal Concept Analysis, and Entity-Relationship
database modeling.
1 The RS-FCA Community
The theory of Rough Sets initiated by Zdzislaw Pawlak [4] is used to model
imprecise or incomplete knowledge and approximate classification. The the-
ory of Formal Concept Analysis initiated by Rudolf Wille [5] is used for data
modeling, analysis and interpretation, and also for knowledge representation
and knowledge discovery via the special technique of attribute exploration or
the more general technique of concept exploration. Rough Sets and Formal
Concept Analysis have much in common, both in terms of goals and method-
ologies. Various analogies (∼=) and identities (≡) between Rough Sets notions
and Formal Concept Analysis notions are listed here.
1
Rough Sets Formal Concept Analysis
approximation space [4] ≡ formal context morphism
indexed collection of subsets ≡ formal context [5]
— ≡ concept lattice
information system ≡ many-valued formal context [2]
discretization
attribute-value pairing
subranging
complementation
...


∼=
interpretation via constraints [1, 2]
(special case: conceptual scaling)
certain rule ≡ implication
possible rule ≡ certain rule with dichotomic scaling
rough measure of rule ∼=


rough measure of implication
U
k
⇒ V when |U
′∩V ′|
|U ′| = k
partial implication
Rough Sets works directly with information systems ≡ many-valued formal
contexts, and only implicitly with a derived structure containing attribute-
value pairs, whereas Formal Concept Analysis has an explicit transformation
[many-valued formal context ⇒ (ordinary) formal context] called conceptual
scaling, which is regarded as an act of interpretation.
2 Rough Formal Contexts
This paper introduces the new theory of Rough Concept Analysis, which is a
synthesis of Rough Sets and Formal Concept Analysis.
An approximation space is a pair 〈G,E〉, where G is a set of objects or
entities and E is an equivalence relation on G called an indiscernibility re-
lation. A formal context is a triple 〈G,M, I〉 consisting of a set of objects
G, a set of attributes M , and a binary incidence relation I ⊆ G×M be-
tween G and M , where gIm asserts that “object g has attribute m” for
any object g ∈G and attribute m∈M . A formal concept of a given formal
context will consist of an extent/intent pair (A,B) where the intent B =
A′I
df
= {m∈M | gIm for all g∈A} =
⋂
g∈A gI ⊆ M contains precisely those
attributes shared by all objects in the extent A, and vice-versa, the extent
A = B′I
df
= {g∈G | gIm for all m∈B} =
⋂
m∈B Im ⊆ G contains pre-
cisely those objects sharing all attributes in the intent B. The collection of
all concepts is ordered by generalization-specialization. Concepts with the
generalization-specialization ordering form a complete lattice B〈G,M, I〉 called
the concept lattice of 〈G,M, I〉.
Given any approximation space 〈G,E〉 on objects and given any formal
context 〈G,M, I〉, an attribute m∈M is a definable attribute when its extent
Im ⊆ G is a definable subset of objects w.r.t. indiscernibility relation E. A
definable formal context is a context all of whose attributes are definable. For
any formal context 〈G,M, I〉 we wish to approximate I in terms of definable
contexts. We use two notions for this: an upper approximation of possibility
and a lower approximation of necessity. These two contextual approximations
provide upper and lower conceptual approximations for concepts in B〈G,M, I〉
(see Section 3).
Let 〈G,E〉 be a fixed approximation space on objects G.
[Upper E-approximation] The upper E-approximation of I, denoted by I
E
,
is defined element-wise: for each attribute m∈M , the extent of m in the
upper approximation I
E
is the upper approximation of its extent in I,
I
E
m
df
= Im
E
= {g | [g]E ∩ Im 6= ∅}. This upper approximation is the
left relational composition of I by E I
E
= E ◦ I = [ ] ◦ ∃[ ](I). The
upper approximation of I is the least definable context containing I. The
extent of a subset of attributes B ⊆ M with respect to the upper E-
approximation is B′
I
E =
⋂
m∈B I
E
m =
⋂
m∈B Im
E
⊇
⋂
m∈B Im
E
=
B′I
E
(see the important discussion below about choices). The upper E-
approximation is a monotonic function ( )
E
:CxtG → CxtG.
[Lower E-approximation] The lower E-approximation of I, denoted by IE ,
is also defined element-wise: for each attribute m∈M , the extent of m
in the lower approximation IE is the lower approximation of its extent
in I, IEm
df
= ImE = {g | [g]E ⊆ Im}. This lower approximation is
the left relational residuation of I by E IE = E–\I = [ ] ◦ ∀[ ](I). The
lower approximation of I is the greatest definable context contained in
I. The extent of a subset of attributes B ⊆ M with respect to the lower
E-approximation is B′I
E
=
⋂
m∈B IEm =
⋂
m∈B ImE =
⋂
m∈B ImE
=
B′IE
. Lower E-approximation is a monotonic function ( )
E
:CxtG →
CxtG.
There will be some controversy concerning which definition is better for the
upper approximation of a collection of attributes. The choices are as follows.
1. The stricter choice B′I
E
=
⋂
m∈B Im
E
=
⋃
{[g] | [g] ∩
(⋂
m∈B Im
)
6= ∅}
includes only those equivalence classes which contain an element of the
extent intersection.
2. The freer choice B′
I
E =
⋂
m∈B Im
E
=
⋂
m∈B (
⋃
{[g] | [g] ∩ Im 6= ∅}) ad-
ditionally includes those equivalence classes which contain elements in
each individual extent, but do not contain an element in the combined
extent intersection. In this paper we have chosen this freer definition,
partly for better mathematical tractibility, partly because it corresponds
to direct existential image of contexts from formal concept analysis, and
partly because it by itself has a valid semantics.
For any object g ∈G and any subset B ⊆M , we say that g certainly has all
attributes in B when g∈B′I
E
= B′IE
, and that g possibly has all attributes in B
when g ∈B′
I
E ⊇ B′I
E
. There are three ordering relations for contexts: the upper
(Smyth) order I ≤u J iff I
E
⊆ J
E
, the lower (Hoare) order I ≤l J iff IE ⊆ JE ,
and the rough (Milner) order I ≤ J iff I ≤l J and I ≤u J iff IE ⊆ JE and
I
E
⊆ J
E
. Two contexts 〈G,M, I〉 and 〈G,M, J〉 of G-objects andM -attributes
are E-roughly equal , denoted by I ≡ J , when both I ≤ J and J ≤ I. The rough
order ≤ is only a preorder: it is reflexive and transitive, but it is not necessarily
antisymmetric. To make the rough order into a partial order and to change
rough equality into true equality, we must “quotient out” by rough equality. A
rough formal context in 〈G,E〉 is a collection of roughly equal formal contexts
of G-objects and M -attributes; or, equivalently, a rough context is a collection
of formal contexts of G-objects and M -attributes which have the same upper
and lower approximation contexts. Any quadruple 〈G,E,M, I〉, consisting of
a formal context 〈G,M, I〉 and an approximation space 〈G,E〉 on its set of
objects, can be regarded as the rough formal context consisting of all contexts
roughly equal to I.
3 Rough Formal Concepts
In this section we define the notions of “approximation” and “rough equality”
with respect to formal concepts. Given any approximation space 〈G,E〉 on
objects and given any formal context 〈G,M, I〉, a formal concept (A,B) ∈
B〈G,M, I〉 is a definable concept when its extent A ⊆ G is a definable subset
of objects w.r.t. indiscernibility relation E. All concepts of a definable formal
context are definable formal concepts. Let 〈G,M, I〉 be any formal context with
an approximation space 〈G,E〉 on objects. We wish to approximate concepts
in B〈G,M, I〉 in terms of E-definable concepts. We do this externally in terms
of concepts of the upper and lower approximation contexts of I — two E-
definable formal contexts. Just as for subsets and contexts, we use two notions
for approximating concepts.
[Upper E-approximation] The upper E-approximation of a concept (A,B) ∈
B〈G,M, I〉 is the concept (A,B)
E
∈ B〈G,M, I
E
〉 defined by (A,B)
E
=
(B′
I
E , B
′′
I
E ). Upper E-approximation is a monotonic function ( )
E
which
assigns concepts in the upper approximation concept lattice B〈G,M, I
E
〉
to concepts in B〈G,M, I〉.
[Lower E-approximation] The lower E-approximation of a concept (A,B) ∈
B〈G,M, I〉 is the concept (A,B)
E
∈ B〈G,M, IE〉 defined by (A,B)E =
(B′I
E
, B′′I
E
). Lower E-approximation is a monotonic function ( )
E
which
assigns concepts in the lower approximation concept lattice B〈G,M, IE〉
to concepts in B〈G,M, I〉.
Upper approximation assignment is left adjoint to a lower-join operator
( )E
⊣∨
E defined by
∨
E(A,B)
df
=
∨
{(A1, B1) ∈ B〈G,M, I〉 | A1 ⊆ A} for all con-
cepts (A,B) ∈ B〈G,M, I
E
〉. Hence, upper approximation assignment is a join-
preserving monotonic function. Lower approximation assignment is right ad-
joint to an upper-meet operator
∧
E ⊣
( )
E
defined by
∧
E(A,B)
df
=
∧
{(A1, B1) ∈
B〈G,M, I〉 | A ⊆ A1} for all concepts (A,B) ∈ B〈G,M, I
E〉. Hence, lower ap-
proximation assignment is a meet-preserving monotonic function.
Just as for subsets and contexts, there are three ordering relations for con-
cepts: for any two formal concepts C1 = (A1, B1) and C2 = (A2, B2), the upper
(Smyth) order C1 ≤u C2 iff C1
E
⊆ C2
E
, the lower (Hoare) order C1 ≤l C2 iff
C1E ⊆ C2E , and the rough (Milner) order C1 ≤ C2 iff C1 ≤
l C2 and C1 ≤u C2
iff C1E ⊆ C2E and C1
E
⊆ C2
E
. Two concepts C1 and C2 of a formal context
〈G,M, I〉 are E-roughly equal , denoted by C1 ≡ C2, when both C1 ≤ C2 and
C2 ≤ C1. Again the rough order ≤ is only a preorder. To make the rough order
into a partial order and to change rough equality into true equality, we must
“quotient out” by rough equality. A rough concept of a formal context 〈G,M, I〉
with approximation space 〈G,E〉 is a collection of roughly equal concepts; or,
equivalently, a rough concept is a collection of concepts which have the same
upper and lower conceptual approximations. Rough concepts for E-definable
contexts are crisp, since two concepts are roughly equal iff they are precisely
equal.
4 Example
In Table 1 is an example of a formal context called the Living context. This
formal context is concerned with a simple ecological description of some living
organisms. Although somewhat simplistic, it is quite useful for illustrative
purposes. This was one of several formal contexts presented in a seminar by
Rudolf Wille at the University of Arkansas in 1992. It was originally taken
from an Hungarian children’s television show. We provide a rough conceptual
analysis of the Living context in this paper. Table 1 also contains the concept
lattice for the Living context. The 19 formal concepts of the Living context
{B0,B1, . . . ,B18} represented by indices in Figure 1, include the top formal
concept B0 representing “all Living organisms”, the bottom formal concept
B18 with “no Living organisms”, and formal concepts such as B6 representing
“limbed land organisms”, whose intent consists of the attributes “needs water”,
“is motile”, “has limbs” and “lives on land”, and whose extent consists of the
organisms “Dog” and “Frog”.
{{Leech,Bream,Frog}, {Dog}, {Spike-Weed,Reed}, {Bean,Maize}} (1)
is an example of an indiscernibility relation which forms an approximation space
on the objects of the Living context of Table 1. This indiscernibility relation is
determined by the two conditions: “lives in water” and “needs chlorophyll” —
for example, {Bean,Maize} are those Living organisms which do not “live in
water” but do “need chlorophyll”. The upper and lower approximation contexts
with respect to this indiscernibility relation, are displayed in Table 2. Note that
object set
Le Leech
Br Bream
Fr Frog
Dg Dog
SW Spike-Weed
Rd Reed
Bn Bean
Mz Maize
attribute set
nw needs water
lw lives in water
ll lives on land
nc needs chlorophyll
2lg 2 leaf germination
1lg 1 leaf germination
mo is motile
lb has limbs
sk suckles young
incidence relation
nw lw ll nc 2lg 1lg mo lb sk
Le × × ×
Br × × × ×
Fr × × × × ×
Dg × × × × ×
SW × × × ×
Rd × × × × ×
Bn × × × ×
Mz × × × ×
concept lattice
✈0
nw
✈1 ✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
mo
✈5 ✁
✁
✁
✁
ll
✈11 ❆
❆
❆
❆
lw
✈3◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
nc
✈2 ✁
✁
lb
✈4❆
❆
1lg
✈6 ✁
✁
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✈12 ❆
❆
❆
❆
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
Le
✈15 ❆
❆
❆
❆
✁
✁
✁
✁
✈8◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
✁
✁
✁
✁
✈14◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
❆
❆
SW
✈13 ❆
❆
❆
❆
✁
✁
Br
✈9❆
❆
✁
✁
✁
✁
Ma
✈7 ✁
✁
✁
✁
sk
Dg
✈16 ❆
❆
❆
❆
✁
✁
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
Fr ✈10 ✁
✁
✁
✁
2lg
Bn
✈17◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
❆
❆
✁
✁
✁
✁
Rd
✈
18
❛❛
❛❛
❛❛
❛❛
❛❛
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
✁
✁
✁
✁
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
Table 1: the Living formal context and its concept lattice
upper approximation
I
E
nw lw ll nc 2lg 1lg mo lb sk
Le × × × × ×
Br × × × × ×
Fr × × × × ×
Dg × × × × ×
SW × × × × ×
Rd × × × × ×
Bn × × × × ×
Mz × × × × ×
t0 nw
ll
t1 ✑
✑
✑
✑
mo
lb
t5❆
❆
❆
lw t3◗
◗
◗
◗
nc
1lg
t2 ✁
✁
✁
sk
Dg
t6❆
❆
❆
✑
✑
✑
✑
Le
Br
Fr
t4 ✁
✁
✁
2lg
Bn
Mz
t7◗
◗
◗
◗
❆
❆
❆
SW
Rd
t
8
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
lower approximation
I
E
nw lw ll nc 2lg 1lg mo lb sk
Le × × ×
Br × × ×
Fr × × ×
Dg × × × × ×
SW × × × ×
Rd × × × ×
Bn × × ×
Mz × × ×
t0 nw
t1 ✑
✑
✑
✑
mo
t3 ✁
✁
✁
ll t6❆
❆
❆
lw t2◗
◗
◗
◗
nc
t4 ✁
✁
✁
✑
✑
✑
✑
sk
lb
Dg
t7❆
❆
❆
✑
✑
✑
✑
Le
Br
Fr
t5◗
◗
◗
◗
✁
✁
✁
Bn
Mz
t8◗
◗
◗
◗
❆
❆
❆
1lg
SW
Rd
t
9
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
2lg
Table 2: the upper and lower approximations of the Living formal
context
the attributes “needs water”, “lives in water”, “needs chlorophyll”, “motile”,
and “suckles young” are all definable attributes. Clearly, mutually indiscernible
objects are equivalent in the two approximation tables in Table 2, and can be
replaced by their equivalence class, [Fr] = {Leech,Bream,Frog}, [Dg] = {Dog},
[Rd] = {Spike-Weed,Reed}, and [Bn] = {Bean,Maize}. The concept lattices
for the two approximation contexts of Table 2 are also displayed there.
In Table 3 we list the two assignment maps: the upper approximation con-
ceptual assignment and the lower approximation conceptual assignment. These
define two conceptual indiscernibility relations — the conceptual indiscernibil-
ity of possibility defined as the kernel of the upper approximation conceptual
assignment, and the conceptual indiscernibility of necessity defined as the ker-
nel of the lower approximation conceptual assignment. In Table 3 we use the
notation Bi for concepts in the upper approximation concept lattice, and we use
the notation Bi for concepts in the lower approximation concept lattice. Rough
equality is the meet of the possibility and necessity conceptual indiscernibility
relations. The only distinct roughly equal concepts are
B2 ≡ B6 and B13 ≡ B16.
Consider the concept “limbed animals”, which is indexed by B2 in the orig-
inal context, where it has extent “Bream”, “Frog” and “Dog” (a “Bream” is a
European fresh-water fish related to the Carp), and intent “needs water”, “is
motile” and “has limbs”. This concept is indexed by B1 in the upper approx-
imation context, where it has extent “Leech”, “Bream”, “Frog” and “Dog”,
upper approximation assignment
indiscernibility of possibility
{B0,B5} 7→ B0
{B1,B2,B6} 7→ B1
{B7} 7→ B2
{B3,B4,B8,B9} 7→ B3
{B10} 7→ B4
{B11,B15} 7→ B5
{B12,B13,B16} 7→ B6
{B14,B17} 7→ B7
{B18} 7→ B8
lower approximation assignment
indiscernibility of necessity
{B0} 7→ B0
{B1} 7→ B1
{B3} 7→ B2
{B5} 7→ B3
{B2,B6,B7} 7→ B4
{B8} 7→ B5
{B11} 7→ B6
{B12} 7→ B7
{B4,B14} 7→ B8
{B9,B10,B13,B15,B17,B18,B19} 7→ B9
Table 3: approximation assignments & conceptual indiscernibility
and intent “needs water”, “lives on land”, “is motile” and “has limbs”. This
concept gains the object “Leech” in the upper approximation context, since
“Leech” and “Frog” being indiscernibly equivalent, the object “Leech” possi-
bly “has limbs” there. This concept gains the attribute “lives on land” in the
upper approximation context, since the implication “has limbs” implies “lives
on land” holds there. This concept is indexed by B4 in the lower approximation
context, where it has extent only the object “Dog”, and intent “needs water”,
“lives on land”, “is motile”, “has limbs” and “suckles young”. This concept
loses the objects “Bream” and “Frog” in the lower approximation context, since
“Leech” and “Bream” being indiscernibly equivalent, the object “Bream” does
not necessarily (certainly) “have limbs” (same for “Frog”). This concept gains
the attributes “lives on land” and “suckles young” in the lower approximation
context, since the implications “has limbs” implies “lives on land” and “has
limbs” implies “suckles young” hold there.
In the crisp Living context of Table 1 the concept “limbed animals which live
on land” indexed by B6 is more specialized than the concept “limbed animals”
indexed by B2, and is distinguished from B2 by the characteristic “lives on
land”. Since “Bream” is a fish and does not live on land, in the lower approxi-
mation context where “Bream” and “Frog” are indiscernible, it is not necessary
(certain) that a “Frog” is a land dwelling organism. In this context “lives on
land” is implied by “has limbs”, and is no longer a distinguishing characteristic.
Although “lives on land” serves as a distinguishing attribute for concepts B2
and B6 in the crisp Living context of Table 1, it no longer does in the rough
setting of indiscernibility relation 1. By the same token, although the “lives on
land” attribute distinguishes the object “Frog” from the objects “Leech” and
“Bream” in the crisp Living context of Table 1, it cannot in the rough setting
of indiscernibility relation 1 where these three objects are indiscernible.
Summary
This paper has introduced the new theory of Rough Concept Analysis, which is
a synthesis of Rough Sets and Formal Concept Analysis. Rough Concept Anal-
ysis, which studies the rough approximation of conceptual structures, provides
an “approximation theory” for knowledge representation and knowledge discov-
ery. The notions of upper and lower approximations were extended from subsets
of objects to formal contexts, which are viewed here as attribute-indexed col-
lections of subsets of objects. Upper and lower formal approximation contexts
were used to provide external notions of upper and lower approximation for
formal concepts. Since these conceptual approximations were shown to be join
and meet-preserving monotonic functions between concept lattices, a notion of
rough conceptual join can be defined via upper approximation and a notion of
rough conceptual meet can be defined via lower approximation. All of these
notions were illustrated by a simple example concerning the ecology of Living
organisms.
Data modeling with distributed constraints extends the notion of conceptual
scaling in Formal Concept Analysis by combining it with notions from Entity-
Relationship database modeling [1, 2]. Formal contexts have been shown to
be special cases of distributed constraints (namely, single-sorted distributed
constraints), whereas distributed constraints are interpretable via the notion
of satisfaction in terms of formal contexts. In this model, formal concepts
correspond to database relations, and conceptual meet corresponds to natural
join. In future work I will give a version of contextual approximation in terms of
contextual flow along description functions. Using this approach I will extend
upper and lower approximation from formal contexts to distributed constraints.
Then, rough formal concepts will correspond to rough database relations, and
rough conceptual meet will correspond to rough natural join.
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